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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS: A
JUDICIAL ANOMALY*
Theodore Voorhees**

During its eighteen decades the District of Columbia has had a history
of many courts and endless judicial change. Normally, when tracing the
history of an American court system one can start from its establishment
on a certain date and find, subject to a few changes over the years, that it
has retained its identity.' This is not the case with the courts of the District
of Columbia.
Until very recently, the District's judicial system has evidenced little coherence, foresight, or planning. This is graphically illustrated by Congress's choice of nomenclature for the District's courts. Confusion resulted
when Congress named the District's trial court the "Supreme Court."2
Moreover, the name "court of appeals" has been applied to two neighbor-

ing, but separate courts.3 Further examples include the establishment of
* This article is an expansion of a presentation by the author at a meeting of the
Columbia Historical Society on November 21, 1979. Acknowledgement is made of
assistance furnished by David Lira, class of 1981, Catholic University Law School, in the
preparation of this article.
** Assistant Dean, Placement, Catholic University Law School A.B., HarvardCollege
(1926); LL.B., University of Pennsylvania (1929).
1. See, e.g., Bloodworth, Remodeling the Alabama Appellate Courts, 23 ALA. L. REV.
353, 353-55 (1971); Blume, CaliforniaCourts in HistoricalPerspective, 22 HASTINGS L. REV.
121 (1970); Hammond, Commemoration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the Maryland
Court of Appeals: A Short History, 38 MD.L. REV. 229 (1978); Heiberg, Social Backgrounds
of the Minnesota Supreme Court Justices- 1858-1968, 53 MINN. L. REV. 901 (1969); Smith,
An HistoricalSketch of Oregon's Supreme Court, 55 OR. L. REV. 85 (1976); Williams, Phases
of Tennessee Supreme Court History, 18 TENN. L. REV. 323 (1944); Comment, The Kansas
Court of Appeals, 12 WASHBURN L. REV. 378 (1973).

2. Congress established.the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in 1863. Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 762. See notes 40-51 and accompanying text infra.
3. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia was established by Congress in
1893. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434. The name was changed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1943, Act of June 7, 1943, ch. 426, 48 Stat.
926, and to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1948.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 870 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 43 (1976)). In addition,
there is the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which corresponds to the supreme courts
of the various states. See notes 85-89 and accompanying text infra. This court was origi-
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serving no specified circuits and the creation of a "Superior Court" when there were no inferior courts.
In a period of less than two centuries the District of Columbia has witnessed a procession of courts and court systems. Today, four courts
predominate: the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit;6 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia;7 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals;' and the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia.9 Each of them is to some degree an off-shoot
of the District's first court, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia,
established by Congress in 1801.0
Congress's broad constitutional power to establish a judicial system for
the District of Columbia 1 has provided it with the opportunity to experi5

nally established as the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Act of
Apr. 1, 1942, ch. 207, § 6, 56 Stat. 194.
Two cases illustrate the confusion generated by the use of the name "court of appeals." In
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), the Controller General reduced the salaries of two judges of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Congress had authorized the reduction of the salaries of judges serving on Article I courts pursuant to the
Legislative Appropriation Act, ch. 314, § 107(a)(5), 47 Stat. 402 (1932). The Supreme Court
held the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to be an Article III court, whose
judges serve during good behavior and whose salaries may not be reduced. 289 U.S. at 551.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Subsequently, in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389
(1973), the Supreme Court ruled that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the
Superior Court were Article I courts. The defendant had argued that only Article III courts
were empowered to try felony prosecutions for violations of federal law. Id at 393. In
rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court held that persons convicted for violations of the
D.C. Code have no right to have their cases heard by Article III judges. Id at 407.
4. The first court established by Congress for the District of Columbia was the Circuit
Court of the District of Columbia, Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 105. See notes 1439 and accompanying text infra. The District obtained a federal circuit court of appeals in
1948. See note 3 supra.
5. Congress established the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 1970. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE § 11-901
(1973). See notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1976).
7. In 1936, Congress changed the name of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. Act of June
25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921. In 1948, this court's name was changed to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 24, 62 Stat. 990.
See notes 53-62 and accompanying text infra.
8. Originally created as the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Act of Apr. 1, 1942, ch. 207, § 6, 56 Stat. 194, this court is now the "court of last resort" in the
District of Columbia. D.C. CODE §§ 11-102, 11-721 (1973). See notes 85-89 and accompanying text infra.
9. D.C. CODE § 11-901 (1973). See notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
10. See note 4 supra. See Appendix for a schematic outline of the courts of the District
of Columbia.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 9, 17.
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ment with, improve, and reform the District's court system. This review of
the history of the District's courts will focus on some of the major issues
now confronting American courts' 2 and assess Congress's performance in
dealing with them. The experience within the District should be particularly timely in light of the present, on-going critical reexamination13 of almost every aspect of judicial administration in the United States.
The development of the District's courts may be conveniently separated
into four eras: 1801-1863, the period of the Circuit Court; 1863-1893, the
early years of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; 1893-1948,
the period when the strictly federal courts emerged; and 1948 to date, the
years during which the District obtained something in the nature of a state
court system of its own.
I.

THE CIRCUIT COURT:

1801-1863

By Act of Congress, the District of Columbia became the seat of the
national government on the first Monday of December, 1800.14 On February 27, 1801, Congress established the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, consisting of a chief judge and two assistant judges. 5 One year
later, Congress authorized the court's chief judge to hold a District Court
of the United States with the same powers and jurisdiction enjoyed by the
other United States District Courts. 6 Thus, the Circuit Court was both
federal and local, and during its sixty-two years of existence it was the only
court of general jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. Congress, ever
12. Five particular issues are within the general scope of this article: the importance of
an independent judiciary freed from pressure by the executive or legislature; the question of
a judge's tenure; removal of the disabled judge or the judge guilty of misbehavior in office;
the desirability of specialized courts; and the future of the dual, federal-state court systems.
13. See, e.g., Ashman & Lee, Non-Lawyer Judges.- The Long RoadNorth, CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 565 (1977); Carbon, Berkson & Rosenbaum, Court Reform in the Twentieth Century.- A
Critiqueofthe Court Unification Controversy, 27 EMORY L.J. 559 (1978); Ellis, Court Reform
in New York State.- An Overviewfor 1975, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 663 (1975); Kaminsky, Available Compromisesfor Continued Judicial Selection Reform, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 466
(1979); Leventhal, A Modest Proposalfora Multi-CircuitCourt ofAppeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV.
881 (1975); Meador, The FederalJudiciaryand its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV.
1031 (1979); Symposium.- State Courts in the 1980s and Beyond, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 711
(1979).
14. Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 130.
15. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 105. William Kilty of Maryland was appointed Chief Judge, and James Marshall of Virginia (brother of Chief Justice John Marshall) and William Cranch were appointed assistant judges. See Came, Life and Times of
William Cranch, Judge ofthe District Circuit Court 1801-1855, 5 REC. COLUM. HIST. SOC'Y
294 (1902); Cox, Address to the District of Columbia Bar, 23 WASH. L. REP. 498 (Mar. 2,
1895).
16. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 24, 2 Stat. 166.
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preoccupied with national rather than local affairs, waited almost a cenDistrict's courts and assigning them
tury and a half before sorting out the
7
roles.'
federal
or
local
purely
either
William Cranch, a staunch Federalist, served as chief judge of the Circuit Court from 1806 until 1855. The nephew of President John Adams'
wife, Cranch had originally been appointed an associate judge on February 29, 1801, the eve of Adams' departure from office. Because of this
lame duck appointment, Cranch was included among the "midnight
8
judges" so bitterly condemned by Jefferson and the Republicans.'
Yet, despite his political antagonism toward Adams and the Federalists,
Jefferson in 1806 appointed Cranch the chief judge of the Circuit Court.
In so doing, Jefferson was faithful to his declaration that: "We are all
Federalists; we are all Republicans . . .the sole criterion for appointment
to office must be an affirmative answer to the questions: Is he honest? Is
he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?"' 9 Jefferson, a president
seldom praised for the promotion of nonpartisanship, set an important political example in making the Cranch appointment. Nevertheless, with
merit selection for the judiciary many decades away, District of Columbia
judges constantly had to battle both Congress and the executive to maintain their independence.
Cranch is best remembered outside of Washington, D.C., as the reporter
for the Supreme Court of the United States. He published nine volumes of
that Court's decisions while also reporting the opinions of the Circuit
Court from 1801 until 1840.20 Yet Cranch's greatest contribution was his
performance as a stalwart, independent, and learned judge who served
fifty-four years, 2' a record probably unmatched by any other American
17. The final stage of this process occurred with the passage of the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C.

CODE

§§ 11-101 to 11-2504, 23-101

to 23-1705 (1973). See notes 80-89, 108-24 and accompanying text infra.
18. For an account of the "midnight judges" appointments, see II A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE
OF JOHN MARSHALL 559-64 (1916). In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
decided two years after Cranch's appointment, Chief Justice John Marshall used the contest
over the "midnight" appointments to establish the Supreme Court's power to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional. Id at 176-78.
19. Came, supra note 15, at 296.
20. See Cox, supra note 15, at 499. Cranch's D.C. cases were available in manuscript
form but were not published until 1852. It is said that this gave the older practitioners, who
seemed to remember every case that Cranch had decided, an advantage over their younger
colleagues. Id
21. "Chief Justice Cranch occupied a position in the District Court analogous to that of
Chief Justice John Marshall in the Supreme Court and to him is generally given credit for
the stability of the early court." Fishback, Washington City, Its Foundingand Development,
20 REC. COLUM. HIST. SOC'Y 194 (1917).
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jurist.2 2 Illustrative of Cranch's caliber as a judge is perhaps the most famous proceeding to come before the Circuit Court. Jefferson had ordered
the arrest of two men who were charged with treason for participating in
the Burr conspiracy.2 3 The detainees filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that they were arrested and detained without due
process of law.24 Although the Circuit Court's two associate judges rejected the petition, Cranch stood up to Jefferson with a ringing dissent:
The worst of precedents may be established from the best of motives. We ought to be upon our guard lest our zeal for the public
interest lead us to overstep the bounds of the law and the Constitution; for although we may thereby bring one criminal to punishment, we may furnish the means by which a hundred innocent
persons may suffer.
On appeal, Chief Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court agreed with
Cranch, and the prisoners were released. 26 Thus, Judge Cranch demonstrated early in American judicial history the importance of a judiciary
independent of the executive.
The final events occurring during the Circuit Court's existence caution
against overreliance by the judiciary on protection from the legislature. In
1863 there was a severe conflict among the three branches of government,
with the judiciary getting the worst of it. The judges of the Circuit Court
at that time were Chief Judge James Dunlop and Associate Judges James
S. Morsell and William M. Merrick. 27 All three judges had been appointed to serve during "good behavior., 28 Judge Merrick, however, was
suspected of harboring Southern sympathies. 29 The spark that triggered
22.

Mr. Justice Holmes served 20 years on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

in addition to 29 years on the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Douglas,
who had the longest tenure on the Supreme Court, served 39 years. See L. FRIEDMAN, THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1969).
23.

See M. McGUIRE, AN ANECDOTAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1801-1976, at 8-9 (U.S. Gov't Print. Off. No. 726-

549, 1977) (1976). For a full account of the Burr conspiracy, see 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note
18, at 274-545.
24. See United States v. Bollman and Swartwout, I D.C. (1 Cranch) 373 (1807).
25. Id. at 379 (Cranch, C.J., dissenting).
26. See Exparte Bollman and Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
27. During its existence, the Circuit Court was the second most important court in the
District of Columbia, surpassed only by the Supreme Court of the United States, which had
come into existence 12 years earlier and heard appeals from the Circuit Court involving
judgments of disputes exceeding $100. See Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 8, 2 Stat. 103.
28. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103. Yet, without regard to this provision,
their offices were taken from them when Congress abolished the court in 1863. See notes 3338 and accompanying text infra.
29. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 41-42. See generally, W. WEBB & J. WOOL-

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:917

the conffict was Merrick's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for the release of an underaged soldier. President Lincoln suspended the writ and
Judge Merrick himself was placed under house arrest.3 °
This episode led to the District's first case of court-packing, a subject
usually identified with President Franklin D. Roosevelt rather than with
Lincoln. 3 Although Roosevelt was unsuccessful in his attempt to "pack"
the membership of the Supreme Court, Lincoln encountered little difficulty in persuading Congress to abolish the Circuit Court and to create a
32
substitute, all of whose members were to be appointed by the president.
Lincoln's maneuver occurred in 1863 when the Union's fortunes were
low and the safety of the capital was in danger. He was determined to
have a court in the District of Columbia whose membership was unquestionably loyal.3 3 There was, however, little basis for the suggestion that
any member of the Circuit Court was in fact disloyal.3 4 Nevertheless,
Congress was persuaded to abolish the Circuit Court and to substitute in
its place the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.3 5
In this manner, three judges who had been appointed to serve during
good behavior were forced out of office, without any proof of misbehavior,
by the executive-legislative steamroller. This was a patent abridgment of
the constitutional principle of separation of powers 36 and, of course, a direct violation of article III's command that federal judges hold office during good behavior.37 To no one's surprise, Lincoln appointed four loyal
Republicans to the new court. 38 Twenty years later, however, there was a
partial reparation when President Cleveland reappointed Judge Merrick to
the bench as a member of the successor court.3 9
DRIDGE, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 725-26 (1892)
after cited as CENTENNIAL HISTORY].
30. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 43.
31. See generally W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 57-62 (1962).

[herein-

32. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 45-46.

33. Id
34. Id. at 50.
35. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 762.

36. See generally L.

FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 7-15 (1978).

§ 1.
38. The chief justice was David K. Canter of Ohio, and the associate justices were
Abram B. Olin of New York, Andrew Wylie of the District of Columbia, and George P.
Fisher of Delaware. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 45-46; HISTORY OF THE UNITED
37. U.S. CONST. art. III,

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT IN THE COUNTRY'S
BICENTENNIAL YEAR 2 (U.S. Gov't Print. Off. No. 726-548, 1977) (1976) [hereinafter cited as
BICENTENNIAL HISTORY].
39. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 50. See also CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note

29, at 726.
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II.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
PERIOD -

FIRST

1863-1893

The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia ° was modeled after the
Supreme Court of the State of New York. 41 Both were courts of first instance, but when they sat in "general term" (en banc) they served as an
appellate court, hearing appeals from rulings of the individual judges. In
the District, an appeal from a ruling of general term could be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.4 2 Judges of the District's
Supreme Court were authorized by Congress to hold a District Court of
the United States, with the same power and jurisdiction as other United
States District Courts.43
Two years after the establishment of the new court, it received a rebuff
from the executive branch equal to that delivered by President Lincoln to
the Circuit Court. It occurred, however, under more dramatic circumstances. Following the assassination of Lincoln, Mary Surratt and seven
male civilians were tried by a military tribunal for conspiracy to murder
the President.' Five of the defendants, including Mrs. Surratt, were found
guilty and sentenced to be hanged. The evidence tying Mrs. Surratt with
the conspiracy was meager at best, and five of the nine members of the
District's Supreme Court recommended that the penalty in her case be remitted. President Andrew Johnson, however, ordered the sentence to be
carried out immediately.45
Well after midnight on the eve of the execution, Mrs. Surratt's lawyers
called on Judge Wylie of the District's Supreme Court with a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleged that the military tribunal had
no jurisdiction to try Mrs. Surratt, a defense that was subsequently fully
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States in a similar case.4 6
Judge Wylie ordered General Hancock, the Military Governor of the Dis40. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, 12 Stat. 762.
41. See Barnard, Early Days of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, 22 REC.

COLUM. HIST. SOC'Y 1 (1919); Cox, supra note 15, at 502. See also Metropolitan R. Co. v.
Moore, 121 U.S. 558 (1887). For an exhaustive study of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, that state's intermediate appellate court, see Project, TheAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York. An Empirical Study of its Powers and
Functions as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929 (1979).
42. 'Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 3, 12 Stat. 762.

43. ld
44. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 53-65. For a full account of the Lincoln assassi-

nation and the evidence of guilt of the alleged conspirators, see Mudd, President Lincoln and
his Assassination,50 REC. COLUM. HIST. Soc'y 341 (1952) (Dr. Mudd is the grandson of the
surgeon who operated on John Wilkes Booth).
45. See M. MCGUIRE, supra note 23, at 63.
46. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 1 (1866).
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trict of Columbia and chairman of the military tribunal, to surrender Mrs.
Surratt in court at ten o'clock the following day. Judge Wylie waited in
court until eleven-thirty that morning when Attorney General James
Speed, accompanied by General Hancock, finally appeared. They reported that the court's order could not be complied with since the President had suspended the writ. Then, ignoring the court's majority
recommendation for mercy, the lack of proof of guilt, the issue of the military tribunal's jurisdiction, and the court order itself, the executive branch
proceeded with the hanging of Mrs. Surratt.4 7
Essentially a local court, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
adjudicated controversies of the type generally addressed in the state
courts.4 8 Two attributes, however, distinguished the District's Supreme
Court from the state courts. First, the District of Columbia was a federal
enclave subject to laws prescribed by Congress, and the local courts were
established by acts of Congress.4 9 Much of the confusing history of the
District's courts and the lack of a sensible judicial system stemmed from
the fact that Congress was a national legislature. As such, Congress devoted little time to the less important affairs of the city, however pressing
they might have been to its residents." Second, the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia had an extraordinary power, not possessed by state
courts or the United States District Courts. It was authorized to issue
process against heads of federal executive departments and to enforce their
compliance with its judgments and decrees. 1 The full implications of such
52
power went unrealized until well into the present century.
47. See M. McGUIRE, supra note 23, at 63-64.
48. The Court also had, however, the powers of a federal court. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch.
91, § 3, 12 Stat. 763. See BICENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 38, at 2-3. See generally J.
NOEL, THE COURT-HOUSE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 82-89 (2d ed. 1939). David K.

Cartter, the first chiefjudge of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, was a staunch
Ohio Republican. Cartter served on the court for 24 years and had the reputation of a fine
jurist among his contemporaries. See Barnard, supra note 41, at 20-23; CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 29, at 729. Thus, even though Lincoln played politics with judicial appointments he did not compound this error, as did many of his predecessors and successors,
by appointing judges who were incompetent or second rate. See generally J. BORKIN, THE
(1962).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

CORRUPT JUDGE

50. For example, it took 100 years before Congress could be persuaded to establish a
District of Columbia Code. See Cox, Efforts to Obtain a Code of Laws/or the District of
Columbia, 3 REC. COLUM HIST. SOC'Y 115 (1900).
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 3, 12 Stat 763. See E. Williams, The Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia 1863-1928, 1 WASHINGTON PAST AND PRESENT: A HISTORY 226,
240 (J. Proctor ed. 1930) [hereinafter cited as Proctor].
52. It was not until the New Deal legislation that the executive branch found itself

continually in court. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
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III.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:
PERIOD -

1893-1948:

SECOND

THE EMERGENCE OF A FEDERAL

COURT SYSTEM WITHIN THE DISTRICT

In 1893, Congress established a new federal court, the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia,53 and abolished the appellate jurisdiction of
the District's Supreme Court.5 4 The name of this new appellate court was
changed in 1934 to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia,5 5 and in 1948 to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.5 6 The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, however, continued to exercise the powers of both a local and federal court of original jurisdiction until 1936 when it was given a federal
name: the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.57 Until 1970, that court remained heavily engaged in the adjudication
of local controversies, sharing its local jurisdiction respecting certain civil
and criminal matters with the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia.

58

Until 1973, the United States District Court exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all felony cases arising in the District of Columbia, and concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court 59 or its predecessors over
misdemeanors. 6° After the three year "take-over" period provided in the
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,61 the Superior Court
assumed jurisdiction over all criminal matters except for cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 62 The organization
of the District's two federal courts is now generally comparable with that
of their sister courts in the other ten circuits.
Before leaving the developments in the federal court system, it should be
noted that Congress has established certain specialized federal tribunals in
(1935). See generally L. FISHER, supra note 36, at 22-26; W. MURPHY, supra note 31, at 5357.
53. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434. The new court was empowered to review
the orders and decrees of the Supreme Court and those of the Police Court. Subsequently it
entertained appeals from the Municipal Court and the Juvenile Court. See Proctor, supra
note 51, at 226, 243; BICENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 38, at 3-14.
54. Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 7, 27 Stat. 436. See Proctor, supra note 51, at 226.
55. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1976).
Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921.
See notes 71 & 78-79 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
For the criminal jurisdiction of the United States District Court prior to the Court

Reform Act, see D.C. CODE § 11-306 (1961).
61. D.C. CODE §§ 11-101 to 11-2504, 23-101 to 23-1705 (1973).
62. Id. § 11-923.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:917

the District of Columbia. The first to be created was the United States
Court of Claims, which antedates the Civil War.63 It was followed in 1924
by the United States Tax Court,' 4 and in 1948 by the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals.65 In 1956 Congress established the
United States Court of Military Appeals 66 and in 1971 the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals.67 These tribunals were created to adjudicate
controversies in highly specialized areas.
IV.

THE CREATION OF A STATE COURT SYSTEM WITHIN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA

During the District's short history there have been a series of local
courts of limited jurisdiction. Quite often Congress's decision to create,
abolish, or consolidate these courts has been guided primarily by political
considerations.6 8
In 1801, Congress established the Justices of the Peace. 69 Although they
7
started off inauspiciously with the appointment of the "midnight judges,", 1
the Justice of the Peace Court lasted for more than a century. In 1909, the
name of the court was changed to the Municipal Court of the District of
Columbia.7 In 1801 Congress also established the Orphans Court for the
District of Columbia. 72 This court was abolished in 1870 and its jurisdiction was transferred to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.7 3
After a sojourn with the United States District Court, probate jurisdiction
was transferred in 1970 to the Probate Division of the Superior Court."
63. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 171
(1976)). See Prelle, History and Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims, 19 REC.
COLUM. HIST. Soc'Y (1916).

64. The United States Tax Court, originally established as the Board of Tax Appeals in
1924, acquired the status of a court in 1954. 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1976).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1976). Also established in 1948 was the United States Customs
Court, which sits in New York City. Id § 251.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1976).
67. The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. 92-210, § 211 (b)(1),
85 Stat. 743, 749 (1971).
68. See, e.g., notes 32-38 and accompanying text supra.
69. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 1I,2 Stat. 103 (1801). See Bundy, A History of the
Office of Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, 5 REC. COLUM. HIST. Soc'y 259

(1902). For an historical account of the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace, see Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1899).
70. See note 18 supra.
71. Act of Feb. 17, 1909, ch. 134, 35 Stat. 623 (1909).
72. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 12, 2 Stat. 103 (1801). See Dennis, Orphan'sCourt
and Register of Wills, District of Columbia, 3 REC. COLUM. HIST. Soc'Y 210 (1899).

73. Act of June 21, 1870, ch. 141, § 5, 16 Stat. 160 (1870).
74. See D.C. CODE § 11-2101 (1973).
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The Criminal Court was established in 1838 to relieve the Circuit Court
of the pressure of criminal trials." It was abolished in 1863, however, and
its jurisdiction was transferred to the District's Supreme Court.7 6 In 1870
the Police Court was established and given jurisdiction over minor
crimes.7" In 1942 it was consolidated into the Municipal Court, which
then exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 78 The name of the Municipal Court was changed in 1962 to the Court of General Sessions of the
District of Columbia.7 9
In 1970, Congress commenced a major reorganization of the District's
courts with the passage of the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970.80 This Act consolidated the Court of General Sessions with the
District's Juvenile Court 8 and Tax Court.8 2 The newly named Superior
Court of the District of Columbia was given jurisdiction over all civil matters arising within the District of Columbia, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.83 It was further empowered to
cases arising under any law applicable exclusively to
handle all criminal
84
the District.
The history of the District's appellate court, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, is relatively brief.85 Its predecessor, the Municipal
Court of Appeals, was established in 1942 to hear appeals from the Municipal Court.86 At its inception the local appellate court was an intermediate
court, since its decisions were reviewable by the United States Court of
75. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 192, 5 Stat. 306 (1838).

76. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 16, 12 Stat. 762 (1863).
77. Act of June 17, 1870, Ch. 133, 16 Stat. 153 (1870).
78. Act of Apr. 1, 1942, ch. 207, 56 Stat. 190 (1942). See Paley v. Solomon, 59 F. Supp.
887 (D.D.C. 1945).
79. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-873, 76 Stat. 1171 (1962). The jurisdiction of
the court was increased to provide exclusive jurisidction over all civil claims not exceeding
$10,000.
80. D.C. CODE §§ 11-101 to 11-2504, 23-101 to 23-1705 (1973 & Supp. 1977). See
M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971).
81. The Juvenile Court was established by Congress in 1906. Act of Mar. 19, 1906, ch.
960, § 1, 34 Stat. 73 (1906). Its purpose was to separate youthful offenders from the criminal
procedures used for adults. See Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
82. Originally established as the Board of Tax Appeals, District of Columbia Revenue
Act of 1937, ch. 690, 52 Stat. 673, the work of the Tax Court has been handled since 1970 by
the Tax Division of the Superior Court. D.C. CODE §§ 47-2401 to 47-2413 (1973).
83. D.C. CODE § 11-921 (1973). See generally Moultrie, District of Columbia Superior
Court, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 717 (1979).
84. D.C. CODE § 11-923 (1973).
85. See generally Newman, The State of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 27
CATH. U.L. REV. 453 (1978).
86. Act of Apr. 1, 1942, ch. 207, § 6, 56 Stat. 194.
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Appeals. 7 The Court Reform Act, however, significantly expanded its jurisdiction. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals is now a court of
last resort, hearing all appeals from the Superior Court and exercising review authority over decisions of the city's mayor and administrative agencies." Its decisions are subject to review only by the Supreme Court of the
United States.89 In essence, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
the same power and stature as the supreme courts of the several states.
V.

THE COURTHOUSES

Even such a condensed history of the District of Columbia court system
as this one would be incomplete without at least a short account of the
courthouses in which the judiciary has functioned.
Prior to the burning of the Capitol by the British in 1814, the Circuit
Court often shared with the Supreme Court a room in the basement of the
Capitol.9" That courtroom was described as "little better than a dungeon."'" During much of the time between 1814 and 1822, the Circuit
Court was virtually homeless, Congress having failed to provide funds for
a court building.92 Finally, in 1823, a courtroom was provided in the District's City Hall. Although the City Hall which was to house the courts in
Judiciary Square originally belonged to the local government, the federal
government took over part of it for the Circuit Court.93 For more than a
century, all the federal and local courts within the District, with the exception of the Supreme Court of the United States, were housed in Judiciary
Square.94
87. Act of Apr. 1, 1942, ch. 207, § 8, 56 Stat. 196. Review by the federal court of appeals
was discretionary in nature. As an intermediate appellate court, the Municipal Court of
Appeals performed "error" review as opposed to the "institutional" review function of the
United States Court of Appeals. See Newman, supra note 85, at 455. See generally Davidson v. Jones, 34 A.2d 261, 262 (D.C. 1943).
88. See D.C. CODE §§ 11-102, 11-721 & 11-722 (1973).
89. Id § 11-102.
90. See J. NOEL, supra note 48, at 11.

91. II W. BRYAN, HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
92. See J. NOEL, supra note 48, at 11-12.

CAPITAL

83 (1914).

93. Id.at 32. Later more courtrooms were made available to the judiciary in City Hall.
Although the rooms are newly furbished, old memories of wrong and injustice
linger there like the odor of mould. "The law was given to men, not to angels"
(Talmud). Hence there are records of crime unpunished and innocence unvindicated, of wrong where the law aided, memories of affliction stronger than the grave
and of hatred stretching its soiled hands to break the quiet of the tomb. All these
dwell about the new court-rooms as the old.

Id at 34.
94. The account of the Judiciary Square courthouses contained in the remainder of this

section is based upon the recollections of Mr. George Fisher, Clerk of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Mr. Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk of the
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The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia moved into the City
Hall in 1863 at the time the Circuit Court was abolished.9" The General
Term (which ultimately became the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia) held its sessions for a time across the street at Building D (now occupied by the Court of Military Appeals) before finally moving in 1952 to the United States Court House on John Marshall Place.
The Special Term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
(which in 1936 became known as the District Court of the District of Columbia) remained in the City Hall until it moved in 1952 to the new Federal Court House on John Marshall Place. It also had courtrooms in the A
Building at 515 Fifth Street, N.W., and the Esso Building at 3rd and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
As the number of judges of the Superior Court increased, building space
was appropriated whenever it could be found in or about Judiciary
Square. Building E at 601 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Building F at 613 Indiana Avenue and the Pension Building on F Street between Fourth and
Fifth Streets, N.W., provided chambers and courtrooms. The Pension
Building alone provided seventeen courtrooms. In 1978 the Superior
Court moved to the new District of Columbia Court House at 500 Indiana
Ave., N.W.
The Municipal Court of Appeals, which in 1968 became known as the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, had its courtroom on the top floor
of the B Building at 409 Fourth Street, N.W. In 1978, that court accompanied the Superior Court in the move to the new District of Columbia
Court House at 500 Indiana Ave., N.W.
Thus, despite the great disadvantages that the courts of the District suffered over a period of many years from wholly inadequate and decentralized housing, the courts now are enjoying modem facilities that add
greatly to their efficiency. The rapid increase in the case loads of the federal courts, however, makes it evident that the "new courthouse," now
nearly three years old, will soon require enlargement or replacement.
VI.

THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS

Every year the courts of the District of Columbia are called upon to
adjudicate dramatic controversies which are often of great significance to
the whole nation. While this article cannot review all of the important
District of Columbia Court of Appeals; and Mr. Joseph M. Burton, Clerk of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia.
95. See notes 27-38 and accompanying text supra.
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cases of the past, several broad types of controversies deserve mention as
illustrations of the unique role which is played by the District's courts.
Although the combined civil caseloads of the District's federal and local
courts greatly exceed their criminal cases in number, it is the latter which
comes to the public mind whenever the subject of "the law" is raised. In
the Prohibition Era (1919-1934), for example, the District of Columbia was
at the center of a challenge to the continuing existence and enforcement of
the eighteenth amendment. 96 The courts were flooded with "liquor cases"
which threatened to destroy their reputation, but were saved at the eleventh hour by the ratification of "Repeal."9 7
As the national revenues move toward being counted in terms of trillions of dollars, also increasing are the dangers of massive corruption. The
courts of the nation's capital must carry the burden of providing a forum
for prosecution when that becomes needed. A notorious case in point was
the trial of Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall for accepting a bribe in
the Teapot Dome scandal. 98 Even today, the General Services Administration has provided yet another scene of dishonesty by government officials. Unless there exists complete integrity and competence in the courts
of the District, confidence in the federal government itself will constantly
erode. But even the efforts by the courts to ferret out corruption are sometimes frustrated. Periodically, congressional legislation will trigger crises
that impose severe challenges upon the very functioning of the courts. The
notorious Volstead Act was one,99 and the recent surge of regulatory activities is another.1°°
The classic illustration of the need for a strong judiciary is, of course,
Watergate. The charges against members of the Nixon administration,
bent on taking the law into their own hands, posed enormous difficulties
for the judges of the local courts before whom their prosecutions were
presented. Those courts proved steadfast and courageous, and Judge Sirica gained and deserved the approbation of the whole country.''
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. Deserving of more than a small footnote in District of
Columbia history was the reign of Mabel Walker Wildebrandt, Assistant Attorney General
from 1921-1929 in charge of enforcing the prohibition law. Many years before "women's
liberation," she brought to the District's courts a crusading spirit that is unmatched even
today.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
98. Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506 (D.C. App. 1931).
99. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 1,41 Stat. 305 (1919) (codified at 27 U.S.C. §§ 189 (1976).
100. Laws governing civil rights, consumer rights, occupational health and safety, and
environmental protection may be cited as examples.
101. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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On the civil side, the role of the District's courts has also been of transcendent importance. During the New Deal period, Congress enacted a
complex legislative program at the behest of President Roosevelt. Much of
it was controversial and the country was in a highly divisive mood. The
prompt testing of the constitutionality of much of the legislation and clear
decisive rulings from the2 courts dispelled the clamor and uncertainty
0
which at first prevailed.'
Additionally, compliance with federal law depends heavily upon the equitable arm of the courts, and not infrequently that of the courts of the
District. One of the most dramatic cases in District of Columbia court
history was the trial of John L. Lewis who refused to comply with an injunction in a labor dispute.'0 3 . Equally heated was the controversy surrounding President Truman's attempted seizure of the steel mills."t° The
high caliber of the judiciary within the District has insured the enforcement of congressional legislation and the fairness of governmental regulation as well.' 0 5
The presence of the federal regulatory agencies in Washington accounts
for a large percentage of the litigation in its courts. The Federal Trade
Commission, the Civil Rights and Antitrust Divisions of the Department
of Justice, the Environmental Policy Administration, and the National Labor Relations Administration are well known in the District's courtrooms,
and the same is, of course, true of the many other agencies as well. The
burden of the congressional determination to regulate the social, financial,
and industrial affairs of the nation has fallen heavily on the courts at the
seat of the goverment.'O0
VII.

MARKS OF PROGRESS

The sweeping court reforms enacted by Congress during the last decade
have gone a long way toward resolving the problems that have plagued the
District's courts in recent years.'0 7 This final section will summarize
102. See, e.g., Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
103. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 70 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1946),

aff'd, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
104. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

105. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 284 F.2d
173 (1960), afl'd, 367 U.S. 887 (1961).
106. See, e.g., National Prohibition Act, 27 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Securities Exchange Act of

1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976); Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1976).
107.

See note 12 supra.
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briefly the changes resulting from the legislation affecting the District's local and federal courts.
A. Merit Selection
Prior to the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act,' °8 all judges of the District's courts were nominated
by the President and appointed with Senate approval.'° 9 The Self-Government Act established a Judicial Nomination Commission to advise the
President on appointments to the Superior Court and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. The Commission is charged with recommending three
qualified candidates for each impending or existing vacancy without regard to party membership." 0 If none of the Commission's recommendations is acted upon by the President within sixty days, the Commission
may nominate one of the candidates subject to senate approval."' The
absence of political sponsorship should remove any necessity for judicial
participation in politics.
The success of the District's merit system has lent encouragement to
President Carter's determination to employ a similar system throughout
the federal judiciary." 2 An important first step was the appointment of a
judicial nominating commission to recommend candidates for United
States Circuit Court judgeships." 3 Some progress has also been made to108. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). See generally McKay, Separation of Powers
in the District of Columbia Under Home Rule, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 515 (1978); Newman &
DePuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony. The District of Columbia Self-GovernmentAct, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 537 (1975).
109. See D.C. CODE § 11-1501(a) (1973).
110. D.C. CODE § 11-434 (Supp. V 1978). The literature on the judicial selection process
in other states is voluminous. See, e.g., Adamany & Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976
Wis. L. REv. 731; Hannah, Competition in Michigan's Judicial Elections.- Democratic Ideals
vs. Judicial Realities, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1267 (1978); Hays, Selection of Judges in
Oklahoma, 2 TULSA L.J. 127 (1965); Henderson & Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in
Texas, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 430 (1968); Kaminsky, supra note 13; Seiler, Judicial Selection in
New Jersey, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 721 (1974); Note, Judicial Selection in the States.- A
Critical Study with Proposalsfor Re/orm, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 267 (1976).
11I. D.C. CODE tit. i1, § 434 appendix (Supp. V 1978).
112. See Symposium, Federal Judicial Selection: The Problems and Achievements of
Carter's Merit Plan, 62 JUDICATURE 465 (May 1979).
113. The United States Circuit Judge Nominating Commission was established by President Carter on February 14, 1977. Exec. Order. No. 11,972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1978). See Berkson, Carbon & Neff, A Study of the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission: Findings,
Conclusions and Recommendations, 63 JUDICATURE 104 (Sept. 1979). See also Fish, Merit
Selection and Politics." Choosing a Judge of the United States Court ofAppeals/or the Fourth
Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1979).
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ward the creation of nominating commissions for the United States District Courts.' 1 4
B. Judicial Tenure
In providing that the District of Columbia judges should serve fifteen
year terms," 5 Congress rejected the system of lifetime appointments enjoyed by federal judges. Nevertheless, it declined to readopt the shorter
ten-year term that local judges had been serving prior to the establishment
of the Superior Court. t t6 The fifteen year term is proving to be a viable
intermediate solution to the complex problem of length of tenure." 7
The District's Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure was also
established by the Self-Government Act. 1 8 Comprised of seven members
serving staggered. terms," 9 the Commission is empowered to remove
judges from the two local courts when it finds that a judge has become
physically disabled or is guilty of misbehavior in office. 2 °
An equally important function of the Commission is to evaluate the performance of judges seeking reappointment. 12 ' If the Commission determines that a judge is unqualified for further service, no second
appointment is permissible.' 2 2 If a judge is found by it to be qualified, the
President is empowered to make or refuse the appointment.' 2 3 If the Commission finds, however, that the applicant is either well qualified or exceptionally well qualified, the judge obtains the second term without further
24
action by the President. 1
C. Court Unification
There have been wide differences of opinion as to the usefulness of specialized courts. 25 Although Congress has frequently established such
114. See Exec. Order No. 12,097, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1979), prescribing the standards for merit
selection of United States District Court Judges.
115.

D.C. CODE § 11-1502 (1973).

116. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 484.
117.

See generally Comment, JudicialTenure in the District o/Columbia, 27 CATH. U.L.

543 (1978).
118. D.C. CODE § 11-431(d)(1) appendix (Supp. 1978).
119. Id.
120. D.C. CODE § 11-432 appendix (Supp. 1978).
121. See Comment, supra note 117, at 560-62.
122. D.C. CODE § 11-433(c) appendix (Supp. 1978).
123. Id
124. Id
125. See, e.g., Ashan & Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DE PAUL L.
REV. 1 (1974); Carbon, Berkson & Rosenbaum, supra note 13; Elston, Administration of the
Courts in Arkansas.- Challenge, Per/ormance and Prospects, 30 ARK. L. REV. 235 (1976);
REV.

Elrod, Practicing Law in a Unied Kansas Court System, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 260 (1977);
Gaxell, Lower-Court Unification in the American States, 1974 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 653; Greenhill &
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tribunals in the District, there has been a growing conviction within the
profession that such a division of judicial labor is unwise 126 and that justice is more efficiently administered in a single, unified court. 127 In creating the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Congress accepted the
latter view and the abolition of numerous specialized courts within the
128
District has been the result.
To enable the Superior Court to deal with its vastly expanded jurisdiction and to exercise its powers as a unified court, the 1970 Court reform
Act increased the number of its judges to forty-four. 129 With its acceptance of modernization, 3 ° the court has begun to set an example of efficiency and effectiveness for federal and state courts throughout the
country. 13 1 Today, there is a growing interest in the development of new
ways of resolving disputes, and perhaps we may see a revival of some new
forms of specialized courts.' 32 The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, however, now stands as a model deserving of a long trial before
turning back toward a fragmented system.
VIII.

THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL-STATE COURT SYSTEM

There may be grounds for reservations concerning Congress's establishment in 1970 of separate federal and local court systems in the District of
Columbia. For seventeen decades the United States District Court and its
predecessors exercised jurisdiction over all federal and nearly all local
matters. 133 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and its predecessors had similarly broad jurisdiction. 134 Thus,
Odam, JudicialReform ofOur Texas Courts - A Reexamination of Three ImportantAspects,
23 BAYLOR L. REV. 204 (1971); Comment, Trial Court Consolidation in Calornia, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1801 (1974); Note, JudicialReform in West Virginia.- The MagistrateCourt
System, 79 W. VA. L. REV. 304 (1977).
126. For an example of an extremely fragmented court system, see Le Clerq, The Tennessee Court System, 8 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 185 (1978).
127. For an examination of state reorganizations, see Berkson, Carbon & Rosenbaum,
Organizing the State Courts.: Is Structural ConsolidationJustjfed?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1
(1978).
128. See notes 70-90 and accompanying text supra.
129. D.C. Code § 11-903.
130. See generally Moultrie, supra note 83.
131. For recent examinations of the case overloads of federal and state courts, see Marcus, Judicial Overload: The Reasons and the Remedies, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 111 (1979);
Sheran & Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1978).
132. For an interesting proposal concerning dispute resolution, see Crastley, Community
Courts. Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution within the JudicialSystem, 3 VERMONT L.
REV. 1 (1978).

133. See notes 40-62 and accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 53-56, 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
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at both the trial and the appellate levels, the semiunified system continued
long after each of the two federal tribunals had become identified as such.
By 1970, however, both federal courts were heavily overburdened.' 3 5 It
was perhaps logical for Congress to relieve their caseload by a massive
transfer of their local jurisdiction to the previously "inferior" District of
Columbia courts. 136 At that time there may have been little reason for
Congress to question the wisdom of departing from the unified experience
and adopting a dual system similar to that found in the states.
In the last decade, however, there have been two developments that
promise to bring the federal and state courts much closer together. The
first concerns the increased workload of the federal courts. 3 7 That case
burden has, in turn, forced the state courts to adjudicate matters formerly
considered exclusively federal. 38 The second development has been the
vast financial support extended to state courts by the federal government
since the passage of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Act
of 1969.139 Despite all the constitutional protections afforded the states, 4 °
state courts are now heavily dependent upon the largess of the federal government. 141
Thus, state courts may face an absorption into the federal court system
partly because their dependence upon federal funds will permit inroads
into their independence by the federal bureaucracy. Perhaps more important, however, is the inability of the federal courts to handle the litigation
spawned by the legislative programs Congress continues to thrust upon
135. See HousE COMM. OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUM., REPORT ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
136. When Congress finally established the District of Columbia Code in 1901, it provided that the judicial power be vested in "inferior courts, namely, justices of the peace and
the police court," and "Superior Courts, namely, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the
United States." Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189. In 1963 the "inferior courts" had
become the Court of General Sessions and the Juvenile Court, while the "superior courts"
were the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 478.
137. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (S. Flanders ed. 1977); Haworth & Meador, A
Proposed New FederalIntermediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 (1978).
138. See note 131 supra. See also Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheller, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961 (1978).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796 (1976).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
141. Address by Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, The Federal Government and the State Courts, delivered to the National College of the State Judiciary (Oct. 14,
1977).
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them.' 4 2 As Assistant Attorney General Meador has pointed out, we are
witnessing a forced take-over by the much larger state court system of
many responsibilities once regarded as strictly those of the federal
43

courts. 1

The District of Columbia has had long experience in handling both federal and local matters without resort to separate court systems. The history
of its courts suggests that an eventual unification of all the nation's courts
might be an acceptable solution to the problems presently confronting the
federal judiciary.

142. Federal Legislation dealing with the environment, civil rights, energy, and consumer protection are prime causes for the caseload burden now overwhelming the federal
judiciary. See note 131 & 137 supra.
143. See Meador, supra note 141.
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